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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IRA EOYAL L. TRIBE, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
—vs-~
SALT LAKE CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

\
I
f
)
\
J

Case No.
13856

Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for a declaratory judgment to determine constitutionality of the Utah Neighborhood Development Act (Section 11-19-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953) and of actions taken and proposed to be taken
by the defendants and respondents pursuant to such act
and to determine the proper interpretation of certain
provisions of such act.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court, sitting without a jury, was presented documentary and testimonial evidence and entered judgment in favor of defendants and respondents
holding that the Utah Neighborhood Development Act
(hereinafter referred to as the "Act") is constitutional
1
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and that certain resolutions of certain of the defendants
are lawful and valid, including resolutions approving a
plan for the issuance of bonds by the Salt Lake City
Redevelopment Agency ("Redevelopment Agency") for
the payment of which certain parking revenues and
"tax increments" are pledged. (E. 99-100).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seeks reversal of the judgment of the
trial court and a declaration that the Act and the activities undertaken and proposed by the defendants pursuant thereto are violative of both state and federal law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs Tribe own real and personal profperty
within an area of Salt Lake City designated as the C.B.D.
West Neighborhood Development Agency Project Area
(the "Project Area")? that is, the blocks and streets adjacent thereto of the two block area bounded on the
north by First South Street, on the east by Main Street,
on the south by Third South Street and on the west by
West Temple Street. (R. 90, 93, 94). Plaintiff Christensen does not own property within the Project Area but
like the Plaintiffs Tribe is a qualified elector and
taxpayer of Salt Lake City and each annually pays property taxes levied by Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County,
Salt Lake City School District and the other taxing agencies who levy taxes on property located within Salt Lake
City. (R. 91). Action was brought by the plaintiffs on
their own behalf and, in Count II, on behalf of themselves

2
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and all other members of a class which they represent
consisting of qualified electors of Salt Lake City who
pay property taxes.
;
Salt Lake City Corporation (the "City") is a city
of the first class organized and operating under the laws
of the State of Utah. (R. 92). The Redevelopment
Agency of Salt Lake City (the "Redevelopment Agency") was created by the City on June 10,1969, in accordance with authority purportedly granted by the Utah
Neighborhood Development Act (Chapter 19, Title 11,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, first adopted as Chapter 5,
Laws of Utah 1969, First Special Session and subsequently amended in part by Chapter 5, Laws of Utah
1970, Chapter 17, Laws of Utah 1971 and Chapter 4,
Laws of Utah 1974, Budget Session; said Act to be distinguished from the Utah Community Development Law,
Chapter 15 of Title 11, Utah Code Annotated 1953).
(R. 91, 121). As authorized by Section 11-19-3, the members of the Board of Commissioners of Salt hake City
Corporation, they being the "legislative body" of the
City, were designated as the Redevelopment Agency
of the City. (R. 91). The official name of the Redevelopment Agency has been established as the "Redevelopment
Agency of Salt Lake City" (See Exhibit 6).
The Redevelopment Agency was created for the
purposes specified in the Act. On February 4, 1971, Salt
Lake City Corporation adopted an ordinance officially
approving a redevelopment plan for the Project Area.
(R. 123, see also Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8). The plan recognized that in this Project Area there were a number

3
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of substandard buildings and uses of land and that
through rehabilitation in some cases or acquisition,
clearance and rebuilding in other cases, the Project Area
could be improved with the result, among other things,
of the "strengthening of the tax base and economic health
of the entire community" (See Exhibit 4, Section B, Subparagraph g; see also R. 93, 94).
Shortly after the adoption of the plan, in May of
1971, federal monies were obtained and in June of 1971
an executive director (M. Danny Wall) and staff were
hired. (R. 120,122). Since May of 1971 only federal monies have been used for the operation of the Redevelopment Agency and no city, county, state or other local
funds have been used in any respect (R. 122,123, see also
Exhibit 9). Prior to May of 1971, no city or other local
funds were appropriated to the Redevelopment Agency
but city officers and employees were used in the formulation of the plan adopted in February of 1971 and in the
presentation of this plan in the application of the Revelopment Agency for federal funds. (R. 122)
Within the Project Area, the Redevelopment Agency
has currently three major projects in active stages of
planning and completion. The first is the construction
of retail stores and an office building on the northeast
corner of Second South and West Temple Streets. This
project is under contract with a developer, West Temple
Associates, and is currently in the stage of formulation
of construction plans. (R. 134, 135) The second major
project is on the southeast corner and is proposed to
consist of an office building and Sheraton Hotel. The
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

developer, Hartnett and Shaw, is currently preparing a
full scale proposal for this project which, if approved by
the Redevelopment Agency, will result in a contract for
the sale and development of this parcel by the developer.
(See Exhibits 10 and 11 for a rendering of the proposal
for this project.)
* •-, r: . ,
^, /
The third major project and the one with which we
are principally concerned in this action is the construction and operation of a parking facility in an area between Second and Third South Streets and extending
to West Temple Street, excluding the corners on West
Temple, the corner at Third South and West Temple
occupied by Valley Bank & Trust and the corner at Second
South and West Temple on which the proposed Sheraton
Hotel Project would be built. (See Exhibit 12 for the
precise location of this project.) Unlike the two other
projects, the parking facilities would be owned by the
Redevelopment Agency and when completed charges for
parking would be made by the Redevelopment Agency.
(R. 143-44, 147) The parking facilities would be operated either directly by the Redevolpment Agency or under lease to a private parking operator, but in either
event the net parking revenues, after payment of operating costs, would be used by the Redevolpment Agency.
(R. 147) Because this is an entirely new parking facility,
neither the City nor the Redevelopment Agency will have
received any revenues from this facility prior to its
completion and operation.
To finance the proposed parking facility, the Redevelopment Agency proposes to issue $15,000,000 of
5
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tax allocation and parking revenue bonds. (R. 92, 146,
147). The nature of this bond issue has been approved
by both the Redevelopment Agency (Exhibit 1) and by
the City (Exhibit 2). The proposed bond purports to be
an obligation of the Redevelopment Agency only and
not of the City or of any other taxing agency and each
bond will contain a statement on the face of the bond
that it is not a general obligation or liability of the City
or any other taxing agency, but only a "special" obligation of the Redevelopment Agency payable solely from
the net parking revenues of the parking facility and
from the "tax increment." (See Section 3 on Page 7 of
the proposed bond resolution, a part of Exhibit 1, R. 21
and also the form of the bond in Section 26 on pages 3738 of such resolution, R. 50-51.
The nature of the tax "increment" or tax "allocation"
requires some explanation. The formula is set forth in
Section 6 of Chapter 4, Laws of Utah 1974 (11-19-29)
and essentially provides that if a redevelopment plan
contains a tax allocation provision, an assessed valuation base for all taxable property within the project
area is established consisting of the assessed valuation
of all taxable property in the project area as of the last
equalized assessment roll prior to the adoption of a plan
containing such a provision. Also, as explained in the
testimony of M. Danny Wall, after the adoption of a plan
containing such a provision and the transmission of
such plan to the County Auditor and County Assessor and
to each of the taxing agencies who levy taxes on property included in the project area, the taxes thereafter

$
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levied are divided between the existing taxing agencies
and the Redevelopment Agency. (R. 156) That portion
of the taxes produced upon the assessed value as of the
base year is allocated to the existing taxing agencies,
the remainder of such taxes, representing the taxes attributable to the increase in assessed valuation from the
base year, is allocated to the Redevelopment Agency.
The taxes thus produced on this increased assessed valuation is the "tax increment" referred to in the bond resolution and which is proposed to be pledged for the payment
of the Redevelopment Agency bonds. (R. 156).
To accomplish this, it will be necessary for the Redevelopment Agency, with the approval of Salt Lake City
and after a public hearing, to amend the existing redevelopment plan to provide for the tax allocation. (See
Utah Code Annotated, §§ 11-19-23,11-19-15 et seq.-20 and
11-19-34.) The amendments so adopted will provide that
the assessment base for this Project Area will be the
assessed valuation for the year 1970, that being the last
equalized assessment roll prior to the adoption of the
original redevelopment plan in February of 1971. (See
R. 96, 99) Thus, from and after the adoption of this
amendment and its filing with the Salt Lake County Auditor, Salt Lake County Assessor, Utah State Tax Commission and the various taxing agencies who tax property in
the Project Area (Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Salt
Lake School District and various special districts such as
the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City, and
the Salt Lake City Mosquito Abatement District), taxes
levied on valuations thereafter assessed will be divided
between the taxing agencies and the Redevelopment

f
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Agency in accordance with the statutory formula. Thus,
if the redevelopment plan is so amended and this is
accomplished in 1974, commencing in 1975, the proceeds
of taxes collected on all property in the Project Area will
be divided between the taxing agencies and the Redevelopment Agency as described above.
Please note that there is no control attempted or
authorized to alter the amount of the levies fixed
by the various taxing agencies or to determine the
assessed valuations of the Project Area from year
to year. All that is done is to divide the proceeds of the
taxes levied, whatever they may be, between the existing
taxing agencies and the Redevelopment Agency in accordance with the statutory formula.
Exhibit 13 shows in terms of known figures plus
projections the effect of the tax allocation for the
Project Area here involved. The 1970 assessed valuation
for all of the taxable property in the Project Area
was slightly in excess of $3,000,000 and this produced
total property taxes by all taxing agencies of approximately $295,000. (See also R. 158) Taking into account
only the estimated increase in assessed valuation as a
result of the two projects in the Project Area, the
building to be constructed by West Temple Associates
and the Sheraton Hotel Office Building complex, the
assessed valuation for the total Project Area would increase to a figure between $6,400,000 and $9,800,000 and
would result in increased taxes being collected in the
Project Area of between $628,000 and $962,000. These
additional taxes would be allocated to the Redevelopment
«
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Agency and this "tax increment" would be pledged for
the payment of the Redevelopment Agency bonds. Exhibit 14 shows that based both upon these projections of
tax increment and similar projections of the parking
revenues, there will be sufficient funds from these two
sources to pay the principal and interest on the bonds
and to build up and maintain the reserve fund required
by the bond resolution.
ARGUMENT
In considering the specific issues of constitutionality
and statutory construction raised by the following arguments, it might be of assistance to consider three basic
issues, the solution of which will assist in solving the
specific issues and which are common to most of these
specific issues. The first of these basic issues is the
legal nature of the Redevelopment Agency — is it a
separate entity public corporation or other type of political subdivision having a legal nature separate from
that of the City, or is it merely a department,
agency or division of Salt Lake City? A second major
issue is the legal nature of the proposed bonds—are they
in fact bonds of Salt Lake City although issued in the
name of the Redevelopment Agency? In either event,
are they to be considered a "general obligation" bond
within the meaning of the election requirement, debt
limit and lending of credit provisions of the Utah Constitution? The third basic issue is the legality of the
proposed construction and operation of the parking
facilities. Will these facilities be considered to have a
purpose essentially private in nature or is there a public

9
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purpose sufficient to justify, constitutionally, the use
of public funds for the construction and operation of
the parking facilities?
POINT I
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VI, SECTION 28,
PROHIBITING DELEGATIONS TO A SPECIAL COMMISSION OF THE POWER TO MAKE, SUPERVISE OR INTERFERE WITH A MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENT OR TO PERFORM MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS IS VIOLATED BY THE
UTAH NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT ACT AND BY
THE CREATION AND OPERATION OF THE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY.

Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 28, (formerly
Article VI, Section 29 prior to the revision of Article VI
which was adopted at the general election in 1971) provides as follows:
,7
The legislature shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere
with any municipal improvement, money, property
or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, to
levy taxes, to select a capitol site, or to perform
any municipal functions.
In Backmafi v. Salt Lake County, 13 UtaJh 2d 412, 375
P.2d 756 (1962), the Utah Supreme Court stated that
three conditions are necessary to violate this provision:
(1) delegation to a private commission of power (2)
to interfere with municipal property or (3) to perform
a municipal function (375 P.2d at 760).

w
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*"'"" A. the Redevelopment Agency is a Special Commission. Although the Utah Neighborhood Development
Act does not expressly declare redevelopment agencies
created under it to be separate public corporations, the
defendant Salt Lake City has treated the Redevelopment
Agency here as such a separate entity. (R.97) The Agency
employs its own officers and employees who are not subject to the rules applicable to city employees generally.
(R. 173, 174) The Agency maintains separate offices,
separate accounting records and a separate payroll. (R.
178) The funds of the Agency are not handled by city
officers nor commingled with city funds, but are maintained in a separate bank account under the sole control
of the Agency. The Agency operates under a separate
budget with fiscal years entirely different than those of
the City (see Exhibit 9), and from time to time the
Agency has borrowed funds under its own name and
under circumstances where any obligation against the
City is directly negated. (R. 175, 177; see also Exhibits
15 and 16) The City has officially recognized the Agency's
separate character and this is particularly evident in the
resolution of October 14, 1971. (Exhibit 6) Although
the members of the Redevelopment Agency are the same
persons as the members of the Board of Commissioners
bf Salt Lake City, they act in different capacities. For
example, the mayor of the City is not automatically the
chairman of the Redevelopment Agency, but the Redevelopment Agency elects its own chairman and secretary.
The former mayor, E. J. Garn, was merely a member of
the Agency and Commissioner Conrad Harrison is the
chairman of the Agency. (See generally R. 91, 174). Le-

li
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gaily, this should be held as more than a mere theoretical
putting on of different hats, because members of the Redevelopment Agency acting in that capacity have primary
fiduciary obligations owed to the Agency to perform their
functions in the best possible way for the benefit of the
Agency even in dealings between the Redevelopment
Agency and the City. See the discussion in Antieau, 3a
Municipal Corporation Law, %30P-12. That there may be
dealings between the City and the Redevelopment Agency
is specifically indicated by Section 11-19-23.1 of the Act.
.;• Finally, we point out that the Redevelopment Agency
is, being subject to the Act, authorized to act solely for
the limited purpose of redevelopment and only in the
manner provided by the Act. Thus, it is not a city authorized to act for a great variety of municipal purposes,
but can only act for the limited purpose for which it was
created. Furthermore, the Utah Neighborhood Development Act seems to authorize the Agency to act initially on
its own behalf without action by the City. For example,
Section 11-10-13 of the Act permits the Agency to adopt
a redevelopment plan but requires that after adoption
of the plan it must be submittted to and approved by the
legislative body of the City. Ordinarily, there would
be no need for such approval if the Agency were considered a department or agency of the City, because in such
case, approval by the Agency would be the equivalent of
approval by the City.
For the foregoing reasons, we urge that the Redevelopment Agency is a special commission within.the
constitutional prohibition.
12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

!
B. There is a Legislative Delegation to the Redevelopment Agency. It was successfully argued by the
defendants that there is no legislative delegation in violation of Article VI, Section 28 even if the Redevelopment Agency is considered a special commission and
even if it is authorized by the Utah Neighborhood Development Act to interfere with municipal improvements
and with municipal functions. Defendants contended and
the trial court held that any delegation involved was a
delegation by the City itself when it created the Redevelopment Agency. The contention is that the City was
authorized to make such a delegation pursuant to the Act
if it chose to do so. (R. 94).
The Utah cases have not specifically addressed themselves to this question. The Utah cases seem to fall
under two categories—first where a state agency was
delegated authority by the legislature which resulted in
an interference with municipal property or municipal
functions. Examples are cases involving the Utah Public
Service Commission, such as City of St. George v. Public
Utilities Commission, 62 Utah 453, 220 Pac. 720 (1923);
Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission, 12 Utah 536,
271 Pac. 961 (1928); County Water Sijstem v. Salt Lake
City, 3 Utah 2d 46, 278 P.2d 285 (1954); State Water
Pollution Control Board v. Salt Lake City, 6 Utah 2d
247, 311 P.2d 370 (1957); and State Tax Commission v.
City of Logan, 88 Utah 406, 54 P.2d 1197 (1936).
A second class of cases has involved the legislative creation or authorization to create special districts or new
types of political subdivisions operating within the geo15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

graphic limit of existing cities or counties. Examples are
Backmanv. Salt Lake County, supra; where certain large
counties were required to hold an election which if approved would result in the establishment of a city auditorium board whose members would be appointed not
exclusively by the county, but also by state officers and
cities located within the county; Lehi City v. Meiling, 87
Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530 (1935), approving an act authorizing metropolitan water districts created by one or more
municipalities after an election by the qualified municipal
electors approving their creation and governed by a board
of directors appointed by the municipalities comprising
the district; Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 119 Utah 274,
226 P.2d 127 (1950) approving an act authorizing the creation of water and sewer improvement districts within
counties, such districts being initiated either by the
county commission or by resident taxpayers of the proposed district and to be governed by a board of trustees
elected from the district; Carter v. Beaver Coumty Service Area No. 1, 16. Utah 2d 280, 399 P.2d 440 (1965),
invalidating an act authorizing the creation of county
service areas in unincorporated areas of a county created
at the instance of either resident taxpayers or the county
commission itself and to be governed by a board of
trustees elected from the service area so created; and
Branch v. Salt Lake County Service Area No. 2,
23 Utah 2d 181,460 P.2d 814 (1969) holding constitutional
on a limited basis an amended version of the county
service area act.
In none of these cases did the court deal expressly
with the question of whether the legislature could author^
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ize a city or county to delegate certain municiparfunetions to a special commission, although this might be
considered implicit in the holdings of at least some of
these cases. For example, the Carter ease, supra, involved
a special district whose creation was initiated by the
county whose municipal functions were found to have
been interfered with. Thus, it would follow that the consent of the county or delegation, if you will, implicit in
the initiation of the district by the county is not sufficient
to avoid the prohibitions of Article VI, Section 28.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court construing a constitutional provision substantially identical to Article
VI, Section 28, held that a municipality cannot, pursuant
to enabling legislation, delegate its powers to a special
commission or private corporation. In Lighten v. Abington Township, 336 Pa. 345, 9 A.2d 609 (1939), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to allow a township to issue non-debt revenue bonds which authorized
a private trust company to assume control of a municipally owned sewage system in the event of default on the
part of the city. The court reasoned:
As the Constitution specifically deprives the state
of power to delegate the management of the municipal property to a private corporation, certainly
the agent, the township, will not make such a delegation ; the effects of the limitation on the principal would be destroyed if the agent could do what
was prohibited. (9A.2d at 612).
California and Colorado have apparently reached a
contrary result, holding that if the creation of a special
district or special commission was approved by the local
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municipality or even By the electors thereof, there is no
violation of a clause similar to Article VI, Section 28.
See, for example, City of Whittier v. Dixon, 24 Cal. 2d
665,151 P.2d 5 (1944); Housing Authority v. Dockweiler,
14 Cal. 2d 37, 94 P.2d 794 (1939); City of Aurora v. Aurora Sanitation District, 122 Colo. 407, 149 P.2d 662
(1944).
We suggest that the Pennsylvania rule should be
followed here. It is consistent with the familiar principles governing the powers of municipal corporations that
"the powers of municipal corporations are delegated
and a municipal corporation may exercise only the powers
granted and in the manner prescribed" (Tooele City v.
Elkington, 100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d 406 (1941)) and that
the powers of a city are "strictly limited to those expressly granted, to those necessarily or fairly implied
in or incident to the powers expressly granted, and to
those essential to the declared objects and purposes of
the corporation . . ." (American Fork City v. Robinson,
11 Utah 168, 292 Pac. 249 (1930); Stevenson v. Salt Lake
City Corporation, 1 U.2d 28, 317 P.2d 597 (1957)). If
the legislature which is the source of most of the powers
of cities and counties in this state cannot act in a particular area because of constitutional limitations, certainly the legislature could not delegate to its agents, the
cities and counties, the power to so act in the same restricted areas.
C. There is Interference with Municipal Improvements and the Performance of Municipal Functions.
There can be no question in this case but that there will
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be a direct interference with municipal improvements.
Recall the testimony of Mr. Wall in describing the plans
for the parking facilities in which he indicated the necessity for rerouting existing city owned water lines and
sewer lines and described the extensive excavation of
the streets made necessary for access to the underground
parking facilities. (R. 181-82) Indeed, on both Second
South and Third South Streets the entrances will be in
the center of the street with obvious interference with
existing traffic patterns. That these changes will be accomplished in cooperation with the City we have no
doubt, but it is cooperation compelled by the activities of
the Redevelopment Agency.
The question of interference with a municipal function is a matter dealt with in most of the Utah cases construing Article VI, Section 28. The purpose of the constitutional provision has been stated to be ". . . to hold
inviolate the right of local self-government of cities and
towns with respect to municipal improvements, money,
property, effects, the levying of taxes, and the performance of municipal functions . . ." (Logan City v. Public
Utilities Commission, supra) and also "to insure, insofar as practicable, the powers to cities and towns to manage their own internal affairs . . <" (State Water Pollution Control Board v. Salt Lake City, supra). The latter
case also contained perhaps the most succinct definition
of the term, "municipal function," by stating the term
"was used in its broad sense and would include any activity properly engaged in by the city or municipality,
whether governmental or proprietary." (311 P.2d at 374)
The case is also instructive in prescribing a territorial
17
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criterion suggesting that regulations of the State Water
Pollution Control Board could not affect or apply to "the
problem of sewerage disposal within Salt Lake City, and
as affecting the inhabitants thereof . . ."• but that such
regulations could apply if there was a menace to the
health of other communities or inhabitants of the state
(311 P.2d at 375). In Backman the operation of a civic
auditorium and sports arena was declared to be a municipal function (375 P.2d at 760). In Carter v. Beaver
County Service Area No. 1, supra, the operation of a
hospital was held to be a municipal function and the
court condemned the broad scope of the act there involved
as permitting the performance of so many traditionally
local functions as to "emasculate the performance of
municipal functions vested by the Constitution of Utah
in the local corporate authorities." (16 Utah 2d at 282).
In this matter we suggest that the activities of
the Redevelopment Agency are more local in character
than they are state-wide in character. In the redevelopment process we are dealing with blighted property. That property, of course, is located in a particular
area and in this case wholly within the corporate limits
of Salt Lake City. Cities have traditionally and for many
years controlled streets and sidewalks within the cities
(see 10-8-8 to 10-8-8.5, 10-8-11, 10-8-23, 10-8-24, 10-8-30
and 10-8-32). Cities have long had the power to control
buildings within the city, not only for safety purposes
but for health and fire purposes (see 10-8-52 to 10-8-55,
10-8-66 and 10-8-70). Regulation of buildings via zoning
and planning has long been considered a municipal
function (see Chapter 9 of Title 10, Utah Code Anno18
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tated 1953). Through a city's power to declare and abate
nuisances, blighted conditions in an area can be cured
(10-8-60; see also Salt Lake City Ordinances, Chapter
26 of Title 18). The power of a city to acquire and
dispose of property is established by Section 10-8-2, Utah
Code Annotated 1953.
Thus, in virtually every aspect of the redevelopment process existing municipal authority can be found.
It is simply a question of whether or not the City chooses
to exercise this authority. Furthermore, the construction
and operation of parking facilities are expressly made a
proper function of cities in this state by Section 10-8-8,
Utah Code Annotated 1953. Parking itself is essentially a
local matter affecting primarily the immediately surrounding area contiguous or at small distances from the
location of the parking facility. While undoubtedly visitors to Salt Lake City from other parts of the state and
nation will be benefitted by improvements to the Project
Area, this is a generalized benefit and the primary benefit remains with the inhabitants of the City. Thus, we do
not contest the trial court's finding of state-wide impact
(R. 94). We merely point out that these are problems
which are characteristically solved on a city-wide basis
with the primary benefits thereof going to the residents
of Salt Lake City.
We are aware of the California cases holding that
redevelopment is a state function (see Fellow v. Redevelopment Agency, 157 Cal. App. 2d 243, 320 P.2d 884
(1958); In re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project IB,
37 Cal, Rep. 74, 389 P.2d 538 (1964), but these California
19
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cases are readily distinguishable because in California
the authority for redevelopment agencies to act is established by a state constitutional provision (Cal. Constitution, Article XIII, Section 19) which, as the Bunker
Hill case pointed out, modified the prior constitutional
provisions granting charter cities control over "municipal
affairs" (389 P.2d at 572). The Colorado cases of Rabinoff v. District Court, 360 P.2d 114 (Colo. 1961); and
People v. Newton, 101 P.2d 21 (Colo. 1940), although
stating generally that urban renewal and public housing
were state functions, are not helpful because both cases
fail to discuss Article V, Section 35 of the Colorado Constitution which is virtually identical to the Utah provisions of Article VI, Section 28.
In conclusion on this point, we commend to the court
the extensive discussion of the history and varying interpretations of constitutiotniai provisions similar to Article VI, Section 28 in the two-part article by David 0.
Porter, "The Ripper Clause in State Constitutional Law:
An Early Urban Experiment," found in Volume 1969
Nos. 2 and 3 for April and June of 1969 of the Utah Law
Review.
POINT II
THE PROPOSED REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY BONDS
CONSTITUTE A DEBT OF THE CITY WITHIN THE MEANING OF UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE XIV, SECTIONS
3 AND 4.

If, in fact, the proposed Kedevelopment Agency
bonds are to be considered in legal effect obligations of
Salt Lake City and if the bonds by their terms are such
20
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obligations as to constitute debt within the meaning of
the constitutional provisions, Article XIV, Section 3
would require the bonds to be authorized by vote of a
majority of the city electors voting at an election where
such a proposition is submitted, and Article XIV, Section
4 would require such bonds to be included in the computation of indebtedness for purposes of the debt limit prescribed in such section. Reference is made to Exhibit 17
for an analysis of the outstanding debt of Salt Lake
City. From this it will be observed that the $15,000,000
of Redevelopment Agency bonds will not in amount
exceed the taxes and other revenues of the City for the
current fiscal year, but because the Redevelopment
Agency bonds are payable and intended to be payable
over a period of years rather than during the current
year, an election would be required if the constitutional
provisions apply (See State v. Spring City, 123 Utah 471,
260'P.2d 527 (1953)). Furthermore, Exhibit 17 indicates
that if the Redevelopment Agency bonds are issued
against the present city general obligation bonded indebtedness and applying the debt limit computed from the
1973 assessed valuation, the debt limit of the City would
not, in fact, be exceeded, but, of course, the availability
of the unused debt limit for other purposes would be diminished to the extent of the $15,000,000 of bonds proposed to be issued.
The real questions then become whether the Redevelopment Agency bonds are to be considered an obligation of Salt Lake City and, if so, whether the bonds are of
the type which would constitute "debt" within the meaning of the constitutional provisions.
21
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A. The Redevelopment Agency Bonds are to be
Considered Obligations of Salt Lake City. In our amended complaint we have pleaded inconsistently and in the
alternative (See paragraph 9, Amended Complaint) and
our'argument is inconsistent and in the alternative to
the argument posed in Part A of Point I. We here contend that the'Redevelopment Agency is in legal effect
simply an agency, department or subdivision of Salt Lake
City and thus obligations of the Agency are, in fact,
obligations of the City. We contest the trial court's Findings of Fact 8, 13 and 14 (E. 93, 95) and Conclusions of
Law 3 and 4 (R. 98-99).
The Utah Neighborhood Development Act in authorizing the creation of redevelopment agencies does not in
terms establish the agency as a separate body politic
and corporate, or as a separate political subdivision of the
state. There is simply no such statement in the law.
Contrast the express statement in Section 11-15-4 relating
to redevelopment agencies created under the provisions
of the Utah Community Development Law, a statute
not here involved. This has great significance for the
application of the constitutional debt limit and election
requirement because the Utah Courts have construed
the constitutional provisions strictly and applied them
only to counties, cities, towns and school districts. Special
districts created by or under the authority of statutes,
which districts are legal entities, separate and apart
from the designated political subdivisions, have been
held not to be subject to the constitutional debt limit (See
Note, "Constitutional Restrictions Upon Municipal Indebtedness/' 1966 Utah Law Review 462 at 478). Thus, in
22
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Lehi City v. Meiling, supra, the court held the debt limitation and election requirements did not apply because
the metropolitan water district was a "quasi-municipal"
corporation rather than a true municipal corporation such
as a county, city, town or school district. Similar holdings were reached in Patterich v. Carbon Cownty Water
Conservancy District, 106 Utah 55,145 P. 2d 503 (1944)
involving the water conservancy districts and Freeman
v. Stewart, 2 Utah 2d 319, 273 P. 2d 174 (1954) involving
improvement districts for water, sewer or sewage systems. See also Tygesen v. Magna Water Company, supra,
and Provo City v. Evans, 87 Utah 292, 48 P. 2d 555
(1935). The distinction has been questioned in the more
recent cases, however. For example, in Backman v. Salt
Lake County, supra, although the case was decided on
other grounds, the court referred to the fact that the
special district there involved may have been established
in order to avoid the constitutional debt limit (375 P. 2d
at 761) and this; could be considered the holding or at
least an alternative holding in Carter v. Beaver County
Service Area No. 1, supra. The decision of Justice Ellett
in Branch v. Salt Lake County Service Area No. 2, supra,
seems to revive the distinction somewhat, but the breadth
of this holding was considerably qualified by the cautions
expressed in Justice Crockett's concurring opinion in that
case (23 Utah 2d at 187-88). Where there is a separate
body politic and corporate established by thei enabling
act, the distinction is perhaps easier to make, but where,
as here, such a separation is not clearly provided for
in the law, proper construction would seem to indicate
that a separate entity was not intended and that the re^
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development agency is in fact a department or agency of
the city which creates it.
r :/
t
A further indication of legislative intent in this regard is the fact that if a city elects to create a redevelopment agency, the legislative body of that city is to be
designated as the agency (See 11-19-3). In other words,
the enabling statute does not authorize anyone but the
legislative body of the community creating the agency to
be the redevelopment agency. Accordingly, it would appear that for redevelopment agencies generally and, of
course, for the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City
here involved, there is an identity between the governing
body of the city or county creating it and the agency itself. (E. 91,94-95)
Note that it is not important at least for purposes
of the election requirement that the redevelopment agency
be defined as a "department" of the city similar to, for
example, its water department. It is enough that it be
considered a "subdivision" of the city ("No d e b t . . . shall
be created . . . by any city . . . or any subdivision thereof
in this state [without an election]").
B. The Redevelopment Bonds Constitute a "Debt"
We recognize that our burden is not met by simply establising the redevelopment agency bonds as some type of
obligation of Salt Lake City. In addition, we must establish, contrary to the findings of the trial court, (R. 95,
98) that these bonds constitute a "debt" within the meaning of the constitutional limitations, for it is clear that
if the obligation were a limited type obligation payable
24
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

only from a special fund, there is no debt, and neither
the election requirements of Article XIV, § 3 of the Utah
Constitution, nor the debt limitations of Article XIV, §
4 would be applicable to the particular obligations.
The special fund doctrine was first enunciated by
our Supreme Court in Barnes v. Lehi City, 74 Utah 321,
279 Pac. 878 (1929). In Barnes, Lehi City's mayor and
councilmen sought to purchase generating equipment
for the city's electric power plant with payments financed
through the issuance of bonds to be retired solely from
revenues received from the operation of the electric plant.
Because the only source of payment of the obligation was
to be the revenues produced from the electric system, the
Utah Supreme Court held that the issuance of the bonds
created no debt in the constitutional sense and thus there
was no requirement that the taxpayers approve the issuance* of the bonds. This result obtained because the
bondholders could not look to any tax money as a source
of payment of the bonds. The principles of this case
have been followed in a number of other cases including:
Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 P. 2d 144
(1933); Wadsworth v. Samtaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28
P.2d 161 (1933), Utah Power and Light Company v.
Provo City, 94 Utah 203, 74 P. 2d 1191 (1937); Utah
Power & Light Company v. Ogden City, 95 Utah 161, 79
P.2d 61 (1938); and Barlow v. Clearfield City, 1 Utah
2d 419, 268 P.2d 682 (1954).
We concede that the Redevelopment Agency bonds
here involved would fit within this special fund exception
if the pledge were limited only to the parking revenues
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because in such case the obligation to the bondholders
would be limited to new revenues derived solely from the
parking facility. The proceeds of the bonds would have
been used solely for the construction of a revenue producing facility, the revenues would not theretofore have
gone into the general fund of the City to help reduce
the property tax burden on the taxpayers of the City,
and the sole source of payment of the bond would be the
new revenues from the parking facility.
However with the addition of the pledge of the tax
increment to the Redevelopment Agency bonds, we contend a debt is created—the pledge of the tax increment
constituting a diversion from the general fund. The
special fund doctrine is limited by the principles of the
Fjeldsted case, supra. There, this court determined that
despite the creation of a special fund which is declared
to be the sole source of payment of the bonds, if some
of the funds going into the special fund had theretofore
gone into the general funds of the municipality, a debt
would be created in the constitutional sense. The Fjeldsted court held that this diversion from the general fund
would indirectly increase the burden on property taxpayers which would impair the protection to taxpayers
intended by the constitution's debt limit and election
requirements.
Note that in Fjeldsted the court did not rely on
proof of any actual diversion of a particular amount of
money from the general fund. A close reading of that
case indicates no evidence being considered by that court
of any diversion in fact. The theory of the court seemed
26
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to be that because the water works system there involved
had, prior to the issuance of the bonds, produced revenues
which, after payment of operation and maintenance expenses of the system, were deposited in the general fund,
the taxpayers had the right to assume that such revenues
would continue to be deposited in the general fund
thus making unnecessary an increase in mill levy or imposition of additional other taxes to cover the general
operating expenses of the city. There was no evidence
that the "diversion" to the special fund in fact caused
an increase in mill levy or other burden on the property
taxpayer. Furthermore, the court did not consider the
other side of the balance sheet—the possible benefits to
the general fund arising from the improvements to the
system financed by the diverted revenues. Without the
financed improvements the general fund might well have
been in worse condition because of the payment of additional expenses of operation and maintenance and the
"burden".on the property taxpayers thus increased.
Thus, on analysis we conclude that the Fjeldsted court
was dealing merely with the possibility of diversion from
the general fund and the possibility of indirect "feeding''
of the special fund from general revenues. See Note,
"Constitutional Restrictions Upon Municipal Indebtedness, '' 1966 Utah ham Review, 462 at 471-78.
In this case we contend the tax increment which is
pledged to the payment of the proposed Redevelopment
Agency bonds constitutes a similar possibility of diversion from the general fund of the City. Indeed, in this
case it seems there is a direct diversion because we are
here dealing with an allocation of the property taxes
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themselves, not revenues of the City other than property
taxes. By the tax allocation provided for in the statute
and authorized in the bond resolution (Exhibit 1) a portion of the property taxes collected will be actually diverted from the City general fund where it would otherwise go and instead pledged to the Eedevelopment Agency
bonds.
The argument that the tax increment is created by
the activities of the agency and thus is not something
on which the property taxpayers of the City could rely,
misses the point. First, the restricted special fund doctrine requires pledge of and payment from only those
funds generated solely from the operation of the facility
financed with the bonds. The doctrine has never been
applied to funds generated from increases in assessed
valuation attributable to construction of the facility or to
redevelopment in the vicinity of the facility. All of the
Utah cases involving cities and towns from Barnes v. Lehi
City, supra, to the present have involved a self-liquidating operation where the pledged special fund was created from the operation of the financed facility. A possible exception to this limitation in Utah jurisprudence
is Conder v. University of Utah, 123 Utah 182, 257 P.2d
367 (1953) where approval was given to bonds used to
finance a dormitory even though land grant revenues in
addition to dormitory revenues were pledged for the
payment of the bonds. This is not a real departure, however, because the court was there construing the state
constitutional debt limit contained in Article XIV, Section 1 and not the city and county debt limits and election requirements of Article XIV, Sections 3 and 4.
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In the second place the premise of defendant that
the tax increment is created by the activities of the Redevelopment Agency is inaccurate. The assessed values
in the area are influenced by more than the mere construction of the parking facility and redevelopment occurring in the area. Land values are characteristically
affected by a great number of factors. There is no evidence indicating some or all of these factors do not
equally apply to land within the Project Area here involved. For example, values are continuously affected
by economic trends, and, more practically, who would
contest that property values can also be affected by what
occurs on adjacent property or by property in the immediate neighborhood. Thus, if substantial additions were
made to the Salt Palace complex, which is outside the
Project Area, there could well be an increase in value
of all properties in the Project Area. Furthermore, the
court, we believe, can take judicial notice of the general
inflationary trend which has increased at least the nominal value of a great many items with real estate perhaps
leading the way. Through tax allocation, the existing
J
taxing agencies, including the City, are deprived of the
benefit, via greater tax collections, of such increases in
value. While it may be said that these potential benefits
are theoretical, they are no less theoretical than the diversion of revenues discussed in the Fjeldsted case.
, We recognize that the Fjeldsted rule sometimes designated the "Restricted Special Fund Doctrine," has
been criticized by text writers (See Williams and Nehemkis, "Municipal Improvements As Affected by Constitutional Debt Limitations," 37 Columbia Law Review 177)
#
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and undoubtedly represents a minority viewpoint (72
A.L.R. 687; 96 A.L.R. 1385; 146 A.L.R. 333). Nonetheless, Fjeldsted has not been overruled and, in fact, has
been cited with approval in the recent case of Allen v.
Tooele County, 21 Utah 2d 383, 445 P. 2d 995 (1968).
Thus, we believe that the pledge of the tax increment
does involve a violation of the restrictions established
by the Fjeldsted case. The consequence is that the bonds
would not be considered payable solely from a special
fund but would be considered "debt" and subject to the
constitutional election requirement and debt limitations of
Article XIV of the Utah Constitution.
POINT III
THE LENDING OF CREDIT PROVISIONS OF OUR CONSTITUTION WILL BE VIOLATED BY THE ISSUANCE
OF THE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY BONDS AND THE
CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF THE PARKING
FACILITIES.

A. There is a Lending of Credit. Allen v. Tooele
County, supra, construed Article VI, Section 29 of the
Utah Constitution and held that credit was not lent in
violation of this provision if the bonds to be issued qualified under the Restricted Special Fund Doctrine of Fjeldsted. However, if the obligations do or might involve a
burden on taxpayers, credit would be lent. Accordingly,
for the same reasons outlined in Point I I contending that
the obligations are city obligations and that the Fjeldsted restrictions are violated, there is a debt involved
here and thus a lending of credit in violation of Article
VI, Section 29. (cf. R. 95, 99)
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B. The Credit Lent is in Aid of a Private Enterprise or Undertaking. The question here involves inquiry
into the public purpose of, first, redevelopment plans
generally, and second, the proposals of the Kedevelopment Agency for the parking facilities to be constructed
in the Project Area.
Many state courts have approved the constitutionality of redevelopment agency legislation usually following the rationale of the United States Supreme Court
case of Berrmm v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), where the
constitutionality of a congressional act authorizing redevelopment for the District of Columbia was upheld.
The Court in that case gave great weight to the legislative declarations of purpose and findings of need for
public participation contained in the enabling statute.
These declarations and findings were said to be "wellnigh conclusive" (348 U.S. at 32). Significantly, the
Utah Neighborhood Development Act contains no such
statements of purpose and no findings that public participation in the redevelopment process is required or
necessary.
Even in cases upholding state redevelopment statutes, limitations have been imposed. For example, in
Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App. 2d 777,
266 P.2d 105 (1954), the court stated: v
It must be pointed out that neither aesthetic
views nor considerations of economic advantage
to the community or a combination of both are
sufficient to justify the use of eminent domain
for redevelopment purposes. The redevelopment
program must be necessary to protect the public
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health, morals, safety or general welfare through
the elimination of blighted areas.
#

#

#

Public agencies and courts both should be
chary of the use of the act unless, as here, there
is a situation where the blight is such that it constitutes a real hindrance to the development of
the city and cannot be eliminated or improved
without public assistance. It never can be used
because the public agency considers that it can
make a better use or planning of an area than
its present use or plan. 266 P. 2d 121, 127 (citations omitted).
Other courts have directly invalidated the legislation.
See, for example, Housing Authority v. Johnson, 74 S.E.
2d 891 (Ga. 1953) and Adams v. Housing Authority, 60
S.E. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952). In the latter case the Florida
Court stated that the incidental benefits accruing to
the public from the establishment of some private enterprise were not sufficient to make the functioning of the
enterprise a public purpose. The thrust of the opinion
suggests that increased employment, revenues and other
varying public benefits were too tangential to give the
entire plan a public purpose.
An extensive discussion of the scope of the public purpose doctrine is contained in the case of Hogue v. Port
of Seattle, 341 P. 2d 171 (Washington 1959). In Hogue,
the act authorized the creation of industrial development districts from land having specified characteristics
and classified as "marginal lands." The opinion of the
court discussed the extensive legislative history which
involved among other things the findings of the legisla-
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ture and citizens' groups that the Seattle area was too
dependent on the single industry of Boeing and that it
was important to develop additional industry for the
area. The act involved contained extensive findings and
declarations of public purpose and of need for the
authority granted to acquire the land and dispose of it
to private enterprise. Despite these findings and declarations, the court concluded that the real purpose of
the proposed acquisitions was merely to provide potential industrial sites for future use by business for factories, warehouses, machine shops or other industrial enterprises. The court further reasoned that each step in
a redevelopment plan becomes incidental to a public
purpose only if the primary purpose of the overall plan
is a public purpose. And, regardless of the honest legislative belief that the acquisition and development of
land for these uses were essentially for the public good,
the Hogue court properly maintained that it was its
duty to uphold the rights of property owners against
the inroads of public bodies seeking to acquire their land
for essentially private purposes. (See 341 P.2d at 193)
Testimony in the instant case was to the effect that
many undesirable conditions existed in the buildings and
structures in the Project Area prior to acquisition and
redevelopment by the Redevelopment Agency (R. 125-27,
Exhibit 7; R. 172-73; see also R. 93-94) We do not dispute
this testimony, but suggest to the court that despite the
trial court's findings, the stubborn fact remains that a
large part of this property will be merely returned to
private enterprise and thus the Redevelopment Agency
is a mere conduit for changing the ownership of a specific
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piece of property from one private owner to another
private owner. Also, we commend to the court the cautions expressed in the Hayes case quoted above. Is the
redevelopment plan necessary to protect the public
health, morals, safety or general welfare through the
elimination of blighted areas in the two blocks contained
in the project, or is it merely a situation where the Eedevelopment Agency here believes that it can make a
better use or planning of an area than its present use or
plan?
A further question arises in considering the parking
facilities portion of the redevelopment plan. Are these
parking facilities, title to which will apparently remain
in the Eevelopment Agency, facilities that will be for
public benefit or will they primarily aid the private
property owners in the immediate area? Consider the
fact that the Sheraton Hotel project will in its lower
stories open out into the parking facility. Consider further the commitments made by the Eedevelopment Agency
to various property owners within the Project Area
that certain parking spaces would be committed for their
use. We recognize this commitment was not in the form
of reserving a designated number of spaces in the parking facility nor was there a commitment not to charge
these property owners for the use of the parking spaces.
Nevertheless, there is a direct involvement with these
adjacent property owners that calls into question the
purely public nature of the facility. Furthermore, parking, particularly in a downtown area as here, will be
used primarily, if not exclusively, by customers, invitees,
and employees of businesses in the immediate area. We
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suggest that the court must balance these private benefits
against the public benefits and if the former predominate,
the Utah Neighborhood Development Act, or at least the
plan for the parking facilities in this case, must fail.
POINT IV
THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF
THE PARKING FACILITIES WILL RESULT IN THE
GRANTING OF PRIVATE BENEFITS CONTRARY TO
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.

In 10b of the Amended Complaint, we have alleged
violation of Article I, Sections 7, 22, 23 and 24 of
the Utah Constitution and the 14th amendment to the
United States Constitution. All of these provisions in
one way or another prohibit public activities in the private sphere and prohibit the use of public funds for private
purposes. For the reasons set forth in Part B of our
Argument under Point III where we discussed public
purpose, we urge that these violations are established,
despite the trial court's contrary findings. (R. 95-96)
POINT V
THE ALLOCATION OF TAXES TO THE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY AND THE USE OF THESE
AND OTHER FUNDS BY THE REDEVELOPMENT
AGENCY VIOLATES UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 5.

Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 5, provides as follows:
The Legislature shall not impose taxes for
the purpose of any county, city, town or other
municipal corporation, but may, by law, vest in
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the corporate authorities thereof, respectively,
the power to assess and collect taxes for all purposes of such corporation.
In State v. Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66 Pac. 1061 (1901),
the Utah Supreme Court first considered this constitutional provision in invalidating a state statute requiring
counties to impose taxes for fruit tree inspectors for the
county where the inspectors were employed and their
duties and functions controlled by a state official. The
court stated that the constitutional provision was "a limitation upon the power of the legislature to grant the right
or impose the duty of creating a debt or levying a tax
to any person or body other than the corporate authorities of the county." (66 Pac. at 1063). The court further
construed this constitutional provision as preserving local
self government for the people of each city and county.
"The right of the legislature was to provide for and put
in action, not to run and operate, the machinery of the
local government to the disfranchisement of the people."
(66 Pac. at 1062).
Subsequent cases have upheld statutes under this
provision if the statute involved a state purpose as
opposed to a city or county purpose (See for example,
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 548, 134
Pac. 560 (1913); Bailey v. Yam Dyke, 66 Utah 184, 240
Pac. 454 (1925); Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Grand County,
51 Utah 294, 170 Pac. 74, 3 A.L.R. 1224 (1917); Smith v.
Carbon County, 90 Utah 560, 63 P. 2d 259, 108 A.L.R.
513 (1936). We have discussed in Part C of Point I of
this brief the question of municipal function as opposed
to state function, and we suggest that the question of
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municipal purpose under Article XIII, Section 5 involves
the same criteria. We conclude here as we did in our
earlier discussion that the operation of the Redevelopment Agency and the carrying out of the redevelopment
plan in this case is a municipal purpose and not a state
purpose.
If there is no state purpose, there is a violation of
Article XIII, Section 5 in the context at least of the tax
allocation provisions of the Act. By the statute, the
legislature requires existing taxing agencies to share a
portion of the taxes they levy with the Redevelopment
Agency. This is a clear interference with the power of
the city and of the county to "collect taxes for all purposes of such corporation." Taxes lawfully collected
must be turned over to the Redevelopment Agency. And
the trial court specifically held that the Agency is neither
a municipal nor a county body. (R. 97) The Agency's
undertakings, the court also held, are not of a municipal
or county-wide nature. (R. 94, 97).
While it might be contended that the City has consented to this by creating the Redevelopment Agency and
approving the proposal to issue bonds secured in part
by the tax increment, this is no answer as regards to
Salt Lake County and the other taxing agencies who levy
taxes in the Project Area. These entities were not involved in the creation of the Redevelopment Agency and
will not be involved in the establishment of the tax increment except as they have the right to object thereto at a
public hearing when the plan is amended to* provide for
the tax allocation (See 11-19-34 and 11-19-16). Taxes
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levied in accordance with law for county and school district purposes and the purposes of the other taxing
agencies will, after collection, be transferred to the Redevelopment Agency and thus it appears there is a clear
violation of the constitutional prohibitions.

POINT VI
THE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY IS SUBJECT
TO THE BUDGETARY LAWS APPLICABLE TO
CITIES.

With regard to the violations of the budget laws, the
record is plain that the Redevelopment Agency here does
not comply with the budget laws applicable to Salt Lake
City. Its budget is entirely independent from the city
budget and receipts and expenditures are handled entirely separate from city funds. (Exhibit 9; E. 130-31,
175-76) If, as we have contended in Point I I of this
brief, the Redevelopment Agency is simply a department,
agency or subdivision of the City, then the normal budget
laws found in Sections 10-10-23 to 10-10-75, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, must be complied with, and fund handling procedures, including the funds pledged to the payment of the proposed Redevelopment Agency bonds
would have to be handled and administered in accordance
with these laws.
POINT VII
THE PROPOSED ALLOCATION OP TAXES USING AN ASSESSED VALUATION BASE OF 1970 CONSTITUTES A RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE
ENABLING LAW IN VIOLATION OF PROPER PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
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In Paragraph 12 of the Amended Complaint we have
alleged that the amended redevelopment plan for the
Project Area proposed by the Redevelopment Agency
will provide for a valuation base as of February 11,1971,
the date of the adoption of the original redevelopment
plan. (This translates to an assessed valuation base for
the year 1970, as that was the last equalized assessment
roll prior to February 11, 1971). Use of the tax increment as a method of financing redevelopment agencies
was first authorized by Chapter 4, Laws of Utah 1974
which became effective April 4,1974. Thus, in 1971 when
the original redevelopment plan was adopted there was
no possibility of including in the plan at that time provision for allocation of the tax increment to the Eedevelopment Agency. We question the right of the Redevelopment Agency to use this retroactive date and
suggest that the amendment must use a base measured
by the last equalized assessment roll at the time of the
amendment to the plan, presumably the assessment roll
for 1973 or for 1974, if it is then final.
There is a general and well established principle
of statutory construction that statutes should be given a
prospective operation only. See 73 Am. Jur.2d, u Statutes" §§ 347-55. In addition to this principle, if the
retrospective operation of a law impairs property rights
or vested rights, the due process clauses of the Utah and
United States Constitutions would be violated (73 Am.
Jur.U "%riistics J i at 485-86).
Exhibit 18 (Total Tax Assessment and Property
Taxes, Blocks 58 and 69, Plat "A" for the years 1966
through 1973, R. 87) indicates that the assessed valua39
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tibn of the Project Area declined from 1970 when it
was $3,289,250 to 1973 when it was $3,048,310, a decline
in these four years of $240,940. Thus, if the 1970 valuation is used when the plan is amended, as is intended by
the Redevelopment Agency, the base for determining
the tax increment will be higher and the amount of the
tax increment less. If this plan is followed, the existing
taxing agencies will suffer less diversion of their tax
resources and the Redevelopment Agency will gain less
tax increment funds. It would thus appear that any
property rights or vested rights of the existing taxing
agencies and the taxpayers thereof would not be impaired by the retrospective application of the statute
and thus our claim of violation of due process is not
factually supportable in the instant case.
However, there still remains the troubling question
of the principle of statutory construction against retroactive applications. The existence of this doctrine creates uncertainty which should be resolved by a declaratory judgment of this court. The only similar case we
have found on this subject is Redevelopment Agency v.
Cooper, 72 Cal. Rptr. 557, (Cal. Ct. App. 1968). That
case held that a 1963 enactment of the California legislature authorizing tax increment financing could be used
by a redevelopment agency established in April of 1959.
The case further held that an amendment to the original redevelopment plan approved in 1968 authorizing
the tax allocation must use the valuation base of 1959
when the plan was originally adopted. There was no
discussion of the rationale for this, the court simply
applying the 1963 statute literally with no real consid-
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eration of the question of retroactivity. Furthermore,
unlike the facts in this case, the assessed valuation had
increased from the date of the original plan to the date
of the amendment by some $5,000,000 and by using the
older assessed valuation as the base for the tax allocation, the Redevelopment Agency obtained a greater allocation than otherwise. Here the converse is true with
the older assessed valuation being higher than the current
assessed valuation.
In view of these uncertainties, we ask that the Court
determine and declare whether or not the statute should
be applied to the 1970 valuation base as opposed
to a current valuation base. We suggest that the current
valuation base is more appropriate.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully suggest
to the Court that the Redevelopment Agency is either a
special commission interfering with activities essentially
municipal in character in violation of Article VI, Section
28 of the Utah Constitution, or a subdivision of the
City, to which constitutional bonding restrictions and
budgeting laws should be applicable.
If the Agency is to be classified as merely a department or subdivision of the City and not as a separate
body politic, the issuance of bonds to finance the parking
facilities must be with the approval of the Salt Lake
City electorate, as the bonds essentially become obligations of the City. It also follows that the bonds are a
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debt in the constitutional sense and the credit of the City
is lent contrary to Article VI, Section 29 of the Utah
Constitution. The Kestricted Special Fund Doctrine does
not provide an exception to these conclusions because
there is a diversion of tax moneys — a pledge of a source
of payment, the tax increment, which indirectly burdens
the taxpayers contrary to the limitations of such Doctrine.
Furthermore, the legislative directive to transfer the
tax increment to a redevelopment agency when a redevelopment plan so provides is an unconstitutional imposition
of taxes for county or city purposes contrary to Article
XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution. The tax increment is not saved from such a constitutional violation nor
is the status of a redevelopment agency as a constitutionally prohibited "special commission" altered by contentions that the Utah Neighborhood Development Act involves a state rather than a municipal or local purpose.
Also, redevelopment plans authorized by the Utah
Neighborhood Development Act are essentially for a
private rather than a public purpose. All these plans can
involve the taking of property from one owner at the
behest of the government in order to transfer the property to another owner, albeit in altered form. This
private purpose is particularly evident in the plan involved in this case where parking facilities will be constructed at public expense whose use involves substantial
private benefits to adjoining property owners. This predominately private purpose confirms the unconstitutional
lending of the public credit for private benefit and also
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gives rise to due process and equal protection violations
of state and federal constitutional provisions.
Finally, and even if no constitutional violations are
found, we ask for an interpretation of the Utah Neighborhood Development Act to require the use of a current
valuation base rather than a retroactive valuation base
where tax increment allocation is adopted as a part of a
redevelopment plan.
For the foregoing reasons, we urge a reversal of
the decision of the District Court.
Respectfully submitted,

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK
& MCDONOUGH
H. R. Waldo, Jr.
Michael D. Hughes
Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants
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Served a copy of the foregoing Brief on Richard Fox
of Strong, Poelman and Fox, Suite 700, El Paso Natural
Gas Building. Salt Lake City, Utah by delivering a copy

to him on .Q^&^:/£

, 1975.
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